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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BASIL THURMAN, RON KESTER,
VAUGHN KESTER and JOSEPH
PAGE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERL D. BYRAM, WILLIAM K.
BYRAM, JOHN D. BYRAM, VAL M.
BYRAM, DONALD E. BYRAM,
KENNETH BYRAM, HARRY J.
WILKINSON, DOROTHY WILKINSON,
his wife, BROWNING INDUSTRIES,
JOHN DOE I .and JOHN DOE II,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16873

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of Duffy
Palmer sitting as the District Court Judge in Morgan
County wherein a judgment was granted against the
defendants on the 20th day of November, 1979.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the plaintiff's a judgment
on their complaint declaring the road in question to be
a public road and that the plaintiffs had a
right-of-way by easement over said road.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the Court reverse the
decision of the District Court and declare that the
road in question is a private road.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants own property located in Cottonwood
Canyon in Morgan County, State of Utah. There is a dirt
road which traverses the Cottonwood Canyon and services
the various property owners in that canyon. A road has
existed in the canyon since before 1925. Prior to 1929,
there were at least three gates located on the road as
it proceeded up the canyon.

(T.114) In approximately

1929, the road was modified and straightened and has
remained in that condition to the present time. The
road in question crosses the Cottonwood Creek. In about
1929, the State of Utah gave the property owners a
bridge that had been previously used on U.S. Highway
305 That bridge was used to span the creek and is now
part of the road which is the subject matter of this
lawsuit.

(T.115 and T.116) The appellants own all of

the property in the canyon including the property over
which the road passes with the exception of approximately two sections of land which were purchased by the
United States Forest Service in 1965. (T.159, 160 &
167,

lines~

through 7) The Forest Service property is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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approximately nine miles up the canyon. The Forest
Service does not have a legal right-of-way across the
property belonging to the appellants. However, the
appellants allow the Forest Service personnel, as well
as all other persons owning property in Cottonwood
Canyon to use the road for access to their property.
(T.25, lines 13 through 22)
In 1978, the property owners, the appellants
herein caused a gate to be installed at the mouth of
the canyon in order to limit the access to the road and
the property located in the canyon. There is an additional section of the road which has been paved in the
vicinity of the Browning Arms Industry. This section of
the road is also privately owned by the appellants.
However, the appellants, over the years, have allowed
this road to be paved and to be used by the public. The
gate that was installed did not, in any way, restrict
access to the paved portion of the road and the paved
portion of the road is not part of the subject matter
of this lawsuit.

(T.124,

lin~

29 through T.25 line 21)

Shortly after the gate was installed on the dirt portion of the road which the appellants claim is a private road, this lawsuit was instigated by the appellants for the purpose of having the Court grant them an
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easement over the road and/or to declare the road
from the gate up Cottonwood Canyon to be a public road.
At the time the road in question was put in its
present condition, which was in approximately 1929, the
property owners caused no trespassing signs to be
placed along the road and upon their private property
which adjoins the road. Exhibits 1 and 2 show part of
the road and a sign which is located beside the road
notifying people that they are not to trespass. The
sign in question is approximately four-foot by
four-foot and has been in existence continually since
1947 or 19500 (T.203) The sign was relocated-in about
1965 so that it was moved closer to the location of the
present gate.

(T.122, line 15 through T.123, line 9)

The sign which is shown in Exhibits 1 and 2 reads
as follows: "No trespassing on private property in this
canyon. Law says no shooting, only in hunting seasons.
It is up to you to know the law and where you are-.
Violators will be prosecuted".
In addition to the sign which is shown in Exhibits
1 and 2, other signs indicating no trespassing have
always existed along the road since 1947. (T.203, lines
1 through 25}- The appellants have also attempted to
notify people by causing various objects along the road
to be painted with an orange paint. The bridge in
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question, as well as rocks and fenceposts along the
road, have been painted orange ever since the Utah
Wildlife Resources issued a proclamation stating that
orange paint indicated private property. This proclamation was first issued in approximately 1973. (T.187,
line 25 through T.189, line 9)
Each year one of the property owners fences off
the road in question in the vicinity of the bridge for
the purpose of using the roadway to handle his sheep.
This occurs about three times a year and amounts to a
total period of about two weeks. During this period
of time no traffic is allowed through the fenced area.
T.209, line 28 through T.211, line 4)
The parties owning property in the canyon have
attempted over the years to limit the access of people
along the Cottonwood Road. For a long period of time
the road was only used by property owners and people
who had business in the canyon. However, this began to
change as vehicles were developed which allowed people
to get into more rugged terrain. Consequently, for
the past twelve to fifteen years the property owners
have had to exert more effort to limit the people that
were attempting to use the road.

(T.120 and 142) The

problem became severe enough that in 1964 the Byram
family, appellants herein, caused a notice to be published in the Ogden Standard Examiner which has general
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circulation throughout Morgan County. That notice read
as follows:
Notice, all hunters! Due to the
disrespect of three hunters
Sunday for private property
and their refusal to comply
with the request of our employees
we are forced to close permanently all lands in Davis,
Morgan and Weber, Cache and
Rich Counties to any and all
forms of use by the public as
of this date. Robert Byram
Sense (Exhibit 3)
At about this same time many of the property owners in
Cottonwood Canyon began to require written

p~rmits

for

people to travel in the Cottonwood Canyon and to hunt
on their private lands. Prior to this time people had
been required to obtain verbal permission and on
occasion the property owners would permit their
neighbors and friends to use the road and property in
the canyon even though they did not obtain specific
permission. (T.176, lines 14 through 16)
The property located in the Cottonwood Canyon
covers an extensive area and the road in question is
approximately ten miles long. Consequently, the owners
were not able to continuously patrol the road or their
propertya (T.128 and 184)
The respondents and the witnesses testifying on
behalf of the respondents stated that they had used the
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road for hunting over the years and during that period
of time had observed the signs along the road indicating that the property was private and indicating no
trespassing. Inspite of these signs, these individuals
used the road and property in the canyon without obtaining permission. (T.57, 58 and 73) These individuals did
not know who owned the property on which the road was
located ..

(TQ42 and 81) Many of them admitted that they

had intentionally and knowingly trespassed upon the
property of the appellants. A few of the respondents
claimed that for a period of twenty years they had been
travelling the road for the purpose of getting· to the
Forest Service land and that they had hunted and camped
on the Forest land not, on private property.· ( T. 64 and
178) However, the evidence was clear that the Forest
land had only been acquired in 1965 and consequently,
the respondents could not have been hunting and camping
on Forest land.

(T.159, 160 and 167)
A R G U ME N T

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IN MANY CASES T.OTALLY UNSUPPORTED BY ANY TESTIMONY WHATSOEVER.
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This matter was tried before the Honorable J.
Duffy Palmer on September 11, 1979. Judge Palmer took
the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum
Decision on the 17th day of October, 1979. That
Memorandum Decision was eight pages long and proported
to outline the testimony given by each one of the witnesses called at the trial. A review of the Memorandum
Decision will demonstrate that Judge Palmer did not
give a fair and impartial hearing to all of the
evidence presented. A casual observation of the Memorandum Decision will demonstrate that Judge Palmer has
attempted to phrase the testimony of the various witnesses in a manner that will support the Judge's ultimate conclusion. The Memorandum is one that you might
expect to be presented by an advocate rather than one
prepared by a Judge who is charged by law to be fair
and impartial. The summary of the testimony given by
the witnesses is inaccurate and in some cases even
diametrically opposed to the actual testimony which was
given at the trial.
One of the best examples of this concerns the
testimony of a Clem Morris, one of the witnesses called
by the respondents. One page 3 of the Memorandum
Decision, Judge Palmer finds that Mr. Morris knew about
the road in_question for 58 years and that from 1920 on
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..

Mr. Morris knew it was a public road and felt that from
that time to the present the road had always been and
used extensively by the publicc In fact, Mr. Morris
did not make any such statements. Mr& Morris testified
that he was not familiar with the Cottonwood Canyon
Road at the present time but had been familiar with it
in the 1920's for a period of 8 years. (T.65, line 20
through T.66, line 20) He testified that he owned
land in the vicinity of the road and that the road was
in a somewhat different position at the time he lived
there than.it was at the time of the trial. (T.66, line
29 through T.68, line 1) He was asked by the
respondents' attorney if he had ever had an occasion to
be in the Cottonwood Canyon since the time he lived
there. His response was "No". (T. 66, lines 18 through
20) Mr. Morris did testify thai he felt the road was
open during the time he lived there; however, he did
not give any testimony about the road being used extensively by the public. It is evident from comparing the
Judge's Memorandum with the actual testimony that the
conclusions of the Judge must have been a figment of
his

imag~nation

since they are not supported by the

testimony of ·Mr. Morris.
The respondents called a Clinton Gruel, an
employee of-the United States Forest Service, as a
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witness. Judge Palmer found Mr. Gruel testified that
the federal goverment paid Morgan County for law
enforcement "of the roadway". This again was totally
unsubstantiated by the evidence. Mr. Gruel testified
that money was given to Morgan County because Forest
Service land was located within the County. He specifically testified that the money was not for the purpose of patrolling the private road leading to the.
forest land. He indicated that the money could not be
expended for use on private land. (P.28, lines 15
through 29) Mr. Gruel also testified that the forest
service did not have any legal rights to the road and
used it only by permission of the property owners and
that when anyone called and inquired of his office
concerning the use of the road, they were informed that
it was a private road.

(T.25, line 18 through T. 26,

line 5)
Judge Palmer found that the former sheriff, Porter
Carter, who had patrolled the road for 16 years
believed the road was open to the public and in fact a

1

public road. Porter Carter in fact testified that he
patrolled the road to keep people from stealing and
destroying private property and that he did not know
that the road was private property. He further testified that when he ref erred to the public using the road

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

he did not distinguish between private property owners
and other people who did n?t own property in the
canyon.

(T.42, lines 3 through 27)

Judge Palmer found that a Delbert Kester, a relative of one of the respondentst testified that he had
used the road since 1937 and that it was always open
and that he was never required- to get a permit from
anyone and did not observe any restrictions on the use
of the road. In fact, Mr. Kester testified that he had
known about the no trespass signs, Exhibits 1 and 2,
for many years and that he knew the private land was
posted but still hunted on that land. (T.58, lines 2
through 30) At one time Mr. Kester had lived on private
property that was located in the vicinity of the road
and consequently, was allowed to use the property.
(T.59, lines 11 through T.60 line 6) He also testified
that he did not know if the people travelling on the
road were doing so pursuant to permission and that he
did not worry about that fact.

(T.60 lines 7 through

15) Mr. Kester and his son had purchased permits from
the Byrams for a period of 2 years and were aware that
the Byrams required individuals to have permits to go
on the property because the permits were sold at Mr.
Kester's place of business, a cafe known as Trout
Springs Cafe, which Mr. Kester owned between 1952 and
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1955. (T.54, lines 19 through 22, T.56, lines 3 through
6, T.63, lines 19 through 26) Even though Mr. Kester
claims to have been

acqua~nted

with the property since

1937, he testified that he was not acquainted with the
Byrams and had never spoken with Mr. Wilkinson concerning the use of the property in the Cottonwood
Canyon. (T.55, lines 19 through 30) He also claimed to
have camped on federal land for 20' years when in fact
the property had only belonged to the forest service
for approximately 14 years. (T.63, line 27 through
T.64, line 13)
Judge Palmer found that Basil Thurman had been
using the property for 29 years without any restrictions or limitations on the use of the road and that he
had seen other people and vehicles using the road. In
fact, Mr. Thurman testified that in over 29 years of
using the road and property that he had never seen any
of the owners of the property in the canyon and had
never talked to anyone except Cecil Byram and that was
by telephone concerning why Mr. Byram had closed his
property. (T.80, line 22 through T.81, line 10) He also
testified that he had been hunting on federal property
for 29 years when in fact the land had only been owned
by the federal government for 14 years.

(T.78, line 13

through T. 79, line 11) Mr. Thurman admitted under oath
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that he had known that permits were required to go on
the property since 1959 and had known about the no
trespassing sign for 29 years. (T.79, lines 21 throu~h
26, T.73, lines 10 through 25)
Judge Palmer found that Joseph Page, one of the
appellants' witnesses, used the road for 11 years
and was never restricted or stopped while using the
road. Joseph Page testified that during the time he
used the road the did not know any of the property
owners with the exception of Val Byram, and that he had
never spoken to any of them concerning the use of
the road.

(T.85, lines 15 through 20) Mr. Page observed

the signs in the area for as long as he had been going
up the road, but he had never at any time inquired to
find out if the road was private or who owned the
property.

(T.86, line 3 through T.88, line 1)

The seventh witness called for the respondents was
Ronald Kester. The Court found that he had been using
the property for 28 years and that there had never been
any limitation on the use of the road. However, Mr.
Kester testified that he had also known about the signs
the along the road including Exhibits 1 and 2 and had
not checked to see if the road was private. (T.96,
line 27 through T.97, line 16) He also testified thathe
had not been on the property since the Byrams began
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selling permits in approximately 1965 except by permission from Mr. Richins.

(T.94, lines 7 through 25)

Judge Palmer found that Vaughn Kester and Elton
LaVar Wood had used the road over a period of time and
had never been restricted in their use. These witnesses, however, testified that they had known about
the signs along the road and had used the property
inspite of the signs. Mr. Kester testified that his
attitude was that he would do what he wanted to on the
land unless someone physically kicked him off. (T.103,
line 29 through T.104, line 4) Mr. Wood testified that
he was a personal friend of Mr. Wilkinson and that he
had Mr. Wilkinson's permission to use the property in
the canyon. (T.107, lines 5 through 30)
As can be seen from the comparisons between Judge
Palmer's findings and the actual testimony given at the
trial, Judge Palmer made many findings that were not
supported by the evidence and in fact were directly
contrary to the evidence presented at the time of the
trial. Judge Palmer, at the end of the trial, took time
to compliment Mr. Harry Wilkinson on his testimony. He
indicated that he thought Mr. Wilkinson was very honest
and candid in his testimony and that it was refreshing
to see that type of testimony presented before the
Court. (T.2il) However, the Judge did not accept Mr.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

Wilkinson's testimony, and in fact, found that Mr.
Wilkinson said many things to which he did not testify.
The Judge claims that Mr. Wilkinson said that the
road in question was at one time a state road. He also
attributes to Mrc Wilkinson a statement to the effect
that the road had been open and that there had been no
restrictions on the road for the last 10 to 12 years.
In fact, Mr. Wilkinson was very emphatic in testifying
to the contrary. Mr. Wilkinson did not at any time
indicate in his testimony that the road had ever been
owned by the state. He did indicate that a bridge had
been removed from state highway #30 and given to the
property owners to be installed across the Cottonwood
Creek in the Cottonwood Canyon. (T.116) He also testified that the county did use some of their equipment to
grade their road on occasion. However, Mr. Wilkinson
pointed out that the county equipment was used in many
occasions for private purposes when requested by county
citizens even including the plowing of the peach
orchards. This practice was stopped during the time
when Mr. Wilkinson was chairman of the Morgan County
Commission.

(T.116 through T.118) Mr. Wilkinson

testified that there was never a time when the property
owners consented that the public could have free and
unlimited access to the road and the property in the
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canyon. He testified that they had done everything
within their power to restrict the road even though
they had allowed the use by friends and neighbors and
peopie that they knew and could trust.

(T.128 lines 11

through 30, T.142, lines 1 through 30) Apparently, the
testimony of Mro Wilkinson relied upon by the Judge to
reach his conclusion that the road had been open was
the testimony given by Mr. Wilkinson ,on Page 119. That
testimony was as follows:
Q Give us a little history on
your recollection of the use of
that road, whether it's been open
ever generally to the public or
whether it's been by permission.

A Well, it hasn't been what
I should say restricted because
most, like Mr. Wood, he's a
friend, or some boy scouts or
somebody that wanted to go camping.
We haven't restricted it to that.
Until recently it's been fairly
well open. There's no question
about that. But, only because we
knew who was going and we weren't
going to get any damage.
Q Was this pretty much by your
permission then and consent?

A Yes, mostly, generally do.
Q All right, do I understand
then for a period of time the
people that would use it were
people that you would be personally
acquainted up until a certain
period of time.

A Yes, until the automobile
started to come, you know, and
stuff like that, there was no
question about it. (T.119, lines 15 through 30)
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It is very important to view this testimony in light of
the overall testimony of Mr. Wilkinson and not to pull

it out of context. The other testimony of Mr. Wilkinson
made it clear that he allowed friends and neighbors and
people known to him to use the road but did not otherwise feel that the road had been opened to the public.
Mr. Wilkinson testified specifically that the property
owners tried to limit the traffic on the road to people
who had written or verbal permission. (T.126, lines 17
through 30) On at least one occasion approximately 14
to 15 years ago Mr. Wilkinson had Sheriff Porter Carter
remove an individual from the private road because he
was doing damage to it. (T.129 lines 18 through 28)
He also testified that he had requested Sheriff Max
Robinson to remove individuals that were on the private
road.

(T.135, lines 2 through 12) Mr. Wilkinson pointed

out that there were six property owners along the road
who had the right to give permission for use of the
road. Consequently, it was not possible for him to
always know which people had permission to use the road
and which people were using the road without permission. (T.143, line 18 through T.144, line 3)
Judge Palmer acknowledged that three of the
defense witnesses, Dee Hancock, Kenneth Hancock, the
Weber County Fire Chief, and Al Conklin, all testified
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that they had used the road from between 20 and thirty
years and had always felt that it was private property
and road and obtained permission before going on the
property. In fact, these witnesses did so testify and
testified that they felt that the road was private and
that they should not use it unless they had permission
from the

owners~

(T.148, 162 and 215)

T~ese

witnesses

also testified that they were aware of the signs along
the road and felt that the signs indicated that the
road was private.

(T.141, 154, 164) All of these

witnesses indicated that they had not seen anything to
indicate to them.that the road was an open or a public
road. (T.148, 154, 162)
One of the witnesses for the defense, Frank
Bowman, is no longer a property owner in Cottonwood
Canyon. He was the individual that sold his land to the
Forest Service in approximately 1965. Mr. Bowman had
been very involved in the county affairs, served on the
county commission and has been on the county planning
commission since 1963. (T.166, lines 4 through 12) Mr.
Bowman testified that Morgan County has not accepted
the Cottonwood Canyon as a public road and has not
received any .PMC road money for that road.

(T.169,

lines 25 through 30)
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Judge Palmer did not give much emphasis to the
testimony of the other appellants in this case. Val
Byram testified that he had caused an article to be published in the Standard Examiner in 1964 notifying
people that the Byrams property was private. A copy
of that advertisement was introduced into evidence
as Exhibit 3. Mr. Byram also explained that written
permits were required in order for people to come
onto their property. A copy of one of those permits
was entered into· evidence as Exhibit 4. Approximately
180 permits were issued by the. Byrams alone each year
for people to travel in the canyon upon the road.
In addition, other individuals were allowed into the
canyon who had permission from the other property
owners that lived on the road. (T.180) Val Byram was
the individual who caused the bridge, fence posts and
other objects in the canyon to be painted orange
thereby·notifying any parties coming into the canyon
that the property involved was private. (T.188) Val
Byram was very emphatic that the use of the road had
always been by permission and that the road have never
beeri open to the public. (T.183)
The comments made by Judge Palmer concerning
the testimony of Kenneth Byram are accurate. However,
the Judge ignored or did not ref er to much of the
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important information testified to by Kenneth Byram.
Mr. Byram testified that the intent of the property
owners in causing the no trespassing signs, Exhibits 1
and 2, to be installed was to indicate that the road
was private and closed.

(T.204) This witness also

testified that their business suffered greatly because
of the trespass of individuals on their property. He
noted one occasion on which one of the cows in the area
was shot fifteen times.

(T.205) Mr. Byram did request

the Forest Service to help keep trespassers off the
road, but the Forest Service refused to do it saying.
that it was impossible.

(T.206, lines 1 through 4)

Leland Kippen, one of the appellants, testified
that the no trespassing signs had been on the road
since he became acquainted with the area in 1950 and
that the road had never been open to the public.
(T.214, 215) Mr. Bill Byram testified that he actually patrolled the road for the purpose of keeping trespassers off the road and property and had filed
criminal actions against individuals who had used
the road.

(T.221, lines 12 through 30) This witness

also testified that the purpose of the no trespassing sign was· to close the canyon and the road.

(T.222,

lines 18 through 23) This witness had personal
knowledge or the fact that the road was closed off each
year to keep the traffic off the road and to allow the
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property owners to use it for their sheep herding
business.

(T.224, line 25 through T.25, line 9)

It is the position of the appellants that a Judge
must fairly and impartially consider all of the
evidence presented to him. The Judge issued the
Memorandum Decision over one month after having heard
the testimony6 This could account for the great
variance between the Judge's findings and the actual
testimony presented at the trial. Regardless of the
reason for the variance, it is clear that the Judge
committed prejudicial error in making findings which
were not supported by the evidence.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE RESPONDENTS HAD A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OVER THE
ROAD IN QUESTION.
In order to establish an easement by use, the
respondents must show by clear and convincing evidence that a prescriptive easement has been established by open, adverse, notorious and uninterrupted
use for a period of in excess of twenty years. Cassit-ty vs. Castagno, 247 P.2d 837 (Utah, 1959) It is
the position .of the appellants that the use must be
of such a nature that the owner is placed upon
notice that_the respondents intend to claim a right
that is adverse to that of the appellants. With that
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knowledge, the appellants must acquiesce in that use
or at least allow that use to continue uninterrupted
for a period of twenty years. The party may not
claim a prescriptive easement by reason of use that
did not become known to the owners of the property.
Such a use obviously would not comply with the
requirements that the use be adverse and notorious.
There have been a number of Utah cases that
have discussed this principle. In the case of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 U. 514, 175

P~2d

714, the Utah

Supreme Court stated that in order to create a prescriptive right-of-way, the adverse use must be
against the owner as distinguished from under the
owner. The Court went on to say that this was true
regardless of whether the use was described as being
adverse, hostile, peaceful or with the consent of
the owner. The Court, in Savage vs. Nielsen, 114 U.
22, 197 P.2nd 117, stated that when a person has the
right to use an easement by reason of the owner's
consent, the use cannot become adverse until the
owner has received notice of the claimant's hostile
use of the land. The Court went on to state that a
prescriptive title to an easement cannot be obtained
when the use is allowed as a mere neighborly accommodation. In the case of Lunt vs. Kitchens, 123 U.
488, 660 P.2nd 535, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
when a landowner consents to the use of his land, such
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use is by license and a prescriptive easement cannot be
created unless the license is renounced. ·The Court went
on to say that the issue is ·whethe·r the use was against
or under the owner.
It is the position of the appellants that the
four respondents in this matter all testified that
they had used the road on a limited basis over the
years for hunting and for occasional picnicing. During
that time they testified that they had seldom, if ever,
seen the property owners or had any contact with them.
These same individuals admitted having seen signs
telling them to stay off the private property but with
that knowledge had still used the road and had used the
property of Frank Bowman and others in the canyon
without their permission. These parties did not even
know who owned the land and obviously made no contact
with the owners to notify them that they were going to
use the property. They claimed that they were using
forest land but the evidence is clear that the land
they used

has only been owned by the forest service

for a period of approximately fourteen years. It is
the position of the appellants that this cannot be an
open, notorious and adverse use in light of the fact
that the appellants did not even know the respondents
were using their land.
It should be noted that Byram and Sons, one of the
property owners in Cottonwood Canyon issued up to 180
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hunting permits each year.

(T.180, lines 8 through 15)

The other property owners also gave permission to
friends, neighbors and other individuals to hunt the
land, and a property owner would honor the permits
given by another property owner in the canyon. Consequently, there were numerous people who would use the
land and the property with permission of the property
owners. The respondents used the road on a limited
basis and most of the use was during the hunting season
when hundreds of people who had permission would be in
the canyon. Consequently, it would be.impossible for
the property owners to know that four individuals were
using the property without authority. Without this
knowledge, the property ·owners could not acquiesce
in that use.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE ROAD IN QUESTION WAS DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO
PUBLIC USE.
Section 27-12-89 of the Utah Code Annotated states
as follows:
Public Use Constituting Dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have
been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been
continuously used for a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
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Dedication is defined in Ballentine's law Dictionary, on page 318 as follows:
The setting aside of land for
public use, in other words the
intentional appropriation or
donation of land, or of an easement
or interest therein by its owner
for some proper public use.
Counsel for the respondents, in a Memorandum submitted to Judge Palmer, made the following statement
concerning dedication: "Dedication requires the
elements of off er or consent by the owner and an
acceptance of this offer by the public.

(26 C.J.S.

399)" The appellants agree with this statement of
law.
The appellants contend that the respondents have
the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that the road was offered to the public by the
property owners or the property owners consented to the
road becoming public and that this off er was accepted
by the public.
In the case of Petersen vs. Combe, 20 U. 2d
376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the burden of proving a public use continuously
for ten (lO)·years must be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence. That case involved a claim that a
road known -as Combe Road in Weber County had been
dedicated as a public street. The court stated that the
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owners of the property abutting or strattling the road
cannot be considered members of the public in order to
establish the public use required by statute. The Court
made a special point of the fact that the evidence
established that the landowners had posted a warning
sign on the road claiming the property to be private.
The sign was introduced at the trial by photograph and
none of the parties seriously contested the fact that
the sign had been in place. There was also testimony
presented that some parties had been aware of the no
trespassing sign and had entered the road with the
consent of the property owners. This case also involved
testimony that certain public agencies such as the
Weber Basin Water Conservatory District, the telephone
company and the Fish and Game Department used the road
with the permission of the property owners to service
their own interests. In view of this evidence, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower Court's decision
and found that public use of the road had not been
established. In doing so the Supreme· court stated
that the burden must be borne by the party claiming
public use by "clear and convincing evidence that
constitutionally must be justified.

." In a dis-

senting opinion issued by Judge Crockett, he stated
as follows:
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.

~

The ownership of property as
evidenced by duly recorded written
documents should be granted a
high degree of sanctity and respect.·
Such ownership should neither be
taken nor eroded away by stealth
or inadvertence in the use or
encroachment thereon by others.
In order for others to acquire
rights therein, the adverse use ·
must be done in such a way that the
owner knows or should know the right
to use his property is being
asserted against him. The proof
of these facts must be clear and
convincing evidence.
Judge Crockett s dissenting opinion was based
1

primarily on the fact that he felt that the Court
should honor the determination· of the trial Judge
in this regard.
A similar decision concerning the burden of proof
was rendered in Thomas vs. Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493
P.2d 639 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
occasional use by the public of unoccupied land with
the knowledge and without objection of the owner will
not create an inference that the owners intended to
dedicate the land as a public road. In the case Culner
vs. Salt Lake City, 27 U. 252, 75 P. 620, the Utah
Supreme Court

stat~d

that an alleyway was not a public

road even though it had been used by the public

for a

number of years when the property owners had always
maintained control over the alleyway and had closed it
from time to time.
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In the case of Gillmor vs. Carter, 15 U.2d 280,
391 P.2d 426 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
road was not dedicated to the public under the state
law. In reaching that decision, the court pointed out
that the owners of the land had installed gates and
signs at strategic points indicating that the land was
not open to the use of the publico The party claiming
the road public acknowledged that he had seen said
gates and signs. The Court also found that it was
important that the landowners had entered into an
agreement to allow certain duck clubs and others to use
the road with their permission and over the years had
instigated lawsuits in defense of their claim that
the property was private. The Supreme Court then stated:
Such actions by owners who have
established a road over their own
lands, even though a portion of
the road traverses land not owned
by them is inconsistent with a
10-year use of this road as a
public thoroughfare.
The Court also cited a law which stated in part as
follows:
Use under private right is not
sufficient. If the thoroughfare
is laid out or use as a private
way, its use, however, long, as a
private·way does not make it a
public way . .
The Court ruled that there must be evidence of intent by the owner or owners to dedicate the road to the
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public and proof of acceptance by the public before the
requirements.of state statutes can be met.
In the case of Morris vs. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P.
1127, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a use of the
road under a private right is insufficient to show a
dedication regardless of how long it has been used and
the fact that the public also uses the road without
objections from the owners will not make it a public
way. In the case of Bonner vs. Fudbury! 18 U. 2d

140,

417 P.2d 646 (1966), the Utah Supreme Court reached a
similar decision. The Court in that case upheld a lower
court ruling that a dead-end road was in fact dedicated
to the public. In its decision, however, it stated
clearly the principle that must be applied in making
that decision. The court stated:
In connection with this review
we deem it appropriate to note our
agreement that the dedication of
one's property to a public use
should not be regarded lightly
and that certain principles should
be adhered to. The presumption is
in favor of the property owner;
·
and the burden of establishing
public use for the required period
of time is upon those claiming it.
The mere fact that members of
the public may use a private
driveway or alley without interference .will not necessarily
establish it as a public way; nor
will the fact that it was shown
on the public records to be a
public_street; nor even that it
had been paved and sign-posted as
a public street by the City . . .
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An extensive dissenting opinion was issued in this
case by Justice Callister in which he reviewed a number
of a cases pertaining to the dedication of a public
right-of-way.
It is the position of the appellants that the
road in question has always been private property
and has been posted as private. The appellants have
never consented to public use of the road and have
done everything in their power to observe the road
as a private road. It is in the contention of the
appellants that the respondents failed to carry their
burden in demonstrating that the road was dedicated to
the public by the property owners and accepted by the
public as a public road.
CONCLUSION
It is the position of the appellants that the
respondents failed to carry their burden in proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the Cottonwood
Road, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit,
was a public road or that the respondents had established a right-of-way by prescription. The appellants
contend that the road has always been private, continually posted as private and that the appellants used
every means reasonably available to them to prohibit
use of the road to all parties except those having
permission from the property owners.
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WHEREFORE, the appellants petition the Court
to dismiss the respondents' claim and

d~clare

the

road in fact a private road and that the respondents
have no prescriptive easement over it.
DATED this

day of March, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Appellants
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